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Abstract
Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to data poisoning
attacks. Prior taxonomies that focus on specific scenarios,
e.g., indiscriminate or targeted, have enabled defenses for the
corresponding subset of known attacks. Yet, this introduces
an inevitable arms race between adversaries and defenders.
In this work, we study the feasibility of an attack-agnostic
defense relying on artifacts that are common to all poison-
ing attacks. Specifically, we focus on a common element be-
tween all attacks: they modify gradients computed to train the
model. We identify two main artifacts of gradients computed
in the presence of poison: (1) their `2 norms have significantly
higher magnitudes than those of clean gradients, and (2) their
orientation differs from clean gradients. Based on these obser-
vations, we propose the prerequisite for a generic poisoning
defense: it must bound gradient magnitudes and minimize dif-
ferences in orientation. We call this gradient shaping. As an
exemplar tool to evaluate the feasibility of gradient shaping,
we use differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-
SGD), which clips and perturbs individual gradients during
training to obtain privacy guarantees. We find that DP-SGD,
even in configurations that do not result in meaningful privacy
guarantees, increases the model’s robustness to indiscrimi-
nate attacks. It also mitigates worst-case targeted attacks and
increases the adversary’s cost in multi-poison scenarios. The
only attack we find DP-SGD to be ineffective against is a
strong, yet unrealistic, indiscriminate attack. Our results sug-
gest that, while we currently lack a generic poisoning defense,
gradient shaping is a promising direction for future research.
1 Introduction
A common paradigm for building a new machine learning
(ML) system is to collect the required training data from sev-
eral sources. Ideally, the data should come from trustworthy
This work was carried out when Varun Chandrasekaran was a visiting re-
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sources. However, the scale of modern ML tasks and chal-
lenges in establishing trust often force practitioners to resort
to unvetted sources. This exposes ML systems to potentially
dangerous training data and enables data poisoning attacks.
In poisoning attacks, the attacker inserts poison in the vic-
tim’s training set to induce it into learning a model whose
behavior is advantageous to the attacker. Data poisoning has
been demonstrated in malware classification [32, 47], spam
filtering [30], and DoS detection [34].
Poisoning has sparked an arms race between proposed
defenses and attacks that defeat them. For example, a data-
sanitization defense called RONI relies on the assumption
that a poison sample in the training set necessarily hurts the
model’s accuracy [8]. While RONI could defend against some
indiscriminate attacks, it was shown to be ineffective against
novel and adaptive targeted attack [42]. In general, prior at-
tacks and defenses emphasized the diversity of information
available to the adversary. In this paradigm, safeguarding ML
models against poisoning requires a strong understanding of
the threat surface exposed by learning algorithms.
In this work, we challenge prior taxonomies of poisoning
in ML and make a first step towards a unified view of the
threat surface. Specifically, we ask: What are some essential
characteristics shared across various poisoning attacks? To
answer this question, we focus on the cornerstone of how most
ML models are trained – using gradients. During training, the
gradients computed on data dictate how a model’s parameters
should be updated; this determines properties of the resulting
model. Stochasticity found in many popular optimizers results
in poisoners having limited control over gradients computed
during training. This gives defenders an edge to reason about
differences between clean and poisoned gradients.
Poisoning attacks rely on two broad approaches to manipu-
late a model’s behavior: feature collision and feature insertion.
For example, to degrade performance, indiscriminate poison-
ing attacks [8,15,22,41] rely on feature collision to overwrite
clean features. Targeted poisoning attacks [39, 42, 50], on the
other hand, rely mainly on feature insertion from the target
samples into the model to cause misclassification on a few
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test-time targets without hurting overall model performance.
Prior work treats these as distinct attacks, because they make
different assumptions about the adversary’s capabilities, such
as the amount of poison that can be inserted in a dataset.
As we consider how poisoning affects gradients, we find
that both scenarios craft poisons that share two properties.
First, the gradients computed from the poison and the clean
samples have observable magnitude and orientation dif-
ferences. Second, these differences grow as we introduce
stronger poison samples. We use these properties to unify the
threat surface of both indiscriminate and targeted attacks.
These properties also suggest design guidelines for a
generic defense strategy effective against more forms of
poisoning. First, gradient-level differences—magnitude and
orientation—between the poison and the clean samples result
in model parameter updates in favor of the adversary. In con-
sequence, an ideal defense should minimize such differences
to ensure that the poison cannot dominate a model’s behavior.
Further, as attacks can still be effective even when poison
samples closely resemble clean ones, a defense also should
not rely on data sanitization, i.e., identifying and removing
malicious samples. Most prior defenses [8, 15, 41] rely on a
form of sanitization, which means they have to make attack-
specific assumptions. Based on these desiderata, we propose
gradient shaping as a step toward defenses that generalize.
In gradient shaping, a defense aims to mitigate poisoning
at the gradient-level during training and remains agnostic to
training samples. As a concrete implementation of gradient
shaping, we experiment with an off-the-shelf tool: differen-
tially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [5]. DP-
SGD is originally a training algorithm that provides differen-
tial privacy guarantees with respect to training data. Because
it clips the norm of individual gradients and adds noise to
them; we find DP-SGD is a suitable candidate for a gradient
shaping mechanism. Thus, we study the feasibility of gradient
shaping with DP-SGD against a wide range of attacks.
We evaluate DP-SGD against two indiscriminate poisoning
attacks [8, 41] and a strong clean-label targeted poisoning at-
tack [39]. Our results on three ML models, linear regression,
multi-layer perceptrons, and convolutional neural networks—
trained on three popular ML tasks, Purchase-100, Fashion-
MNIST, and CIFAR-10—reveal that DP-SGD can be effec-
tive against multiple poisoning attacks, even when DP-SGD
only provides trivial privacy guarantees. For example, against
an indiscriminate attack (random label-flipping), it reduces
the performance degradation by half, and against a one-shot
targeted attack, it prevents targets from being misclassified.
Furthermore, against a multi-poison targeted attack, it also
forces the adversary to blend more poisons and, therefore,
increases the attack’s cost. However, even though we still
observe gradient-level differences, DP-SGD is relatively in-
effective against a strong, albeit unrealistic, indiscriminate
attack [41]. We believe this exposes the limitations of DP-
SGD in performing gradient shaping; therefore, designing
even more suitable mechanisms is an important direction for
future research.
Contributions. In summary, we make four contributions:
• We expose common gradient-level properties across var-
ious forms of poisoning, in contrast to previous tax-
onomies. In particular, we identify that poisoned gradi-
ents have higher magnitudes and are oriented differently
when compared to clean gradients.
• We take a step towards unifying the poisoning threat
surface based on our gradient-level analysis.
• Based on our unified view, we discuss the desiderata
for a generic, attack-agnostic, defense against poisoning
and propose gradient shaping as a defense approach that
fulfills these requirements.
• We utilize DP-SGD as an off-the-shelf gradient shaping
tool. We evaluate the effectiveness of DP-SGD against
various poison attacks with a systematic study on three
ML models and three ML tasks.
2 Preliminaries on ML and Poisoning
In probably approximately correct (PAC) learning [43], there
is an underlying data distribution Z=X ×Y where X is the
domain of inputs and Y the outputs. For example, in spam
email classification, inputs could be emails and outputs are
labels indicating whether these emails are spam or ham. The
objective of a learning algorithm Q is to learn a parameterized
model fθ ∈ H , where H is the space of hypotheses. For
instance, a restricted H could be the space of all parameters
for a particular neural network whose weights and biases θ
need to be learned to obtain a model fθ. The model itself is a
mapping between inputs and labels i.e., fθ : X → Y .
To train such a model, Q has access to a dataset D that
is drawn from the underlying data distribution Z. In the su-
pervised learning setting [36], D is partitioned into disjoint
subsets: the training Dtr and test Dts datasets. We also as-
sume the existence of a non-negative, real-valued loss func-
tion L( fθ(x),y), which quantifies how correct (or incorrect)
the prediction of a model is given an input x and label y.
Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM). Given such a loss
function L , the output of a supervised learning algorithm is
a model fθ which minimizes the risk E(x,y)∼Z [L( fθ(x),y)]
where fθ(x) is the predicted label and y is the true label.
Since the underlying data distribution Z=X ×Y is unknown,
supervised learning algorithms use the training set Dtr of
size m to learn a hypothesis that minimizes the empirical
risk [44]. The empirical risk is defined as 1m ∑
m
i=1L( fθ(xi),yi)
for (xi,yi)∼Dtr. Commonly used loss functions include mean
square error (MSE) and cross-entropy loss [26]. The model
is then tested based on how well it generalizes to the unseen
samples in Dts.
Gradient Descent. Gradient descent has established itself as
the de-facto approach, in particular when it comes to train-
ing neural networks. Known as the backpropagation algo-
2
rithm [35] in the context of neural networks, gradient descent
updates model parameters with a multiplicative of the deriva-
tive of the empirical risk with respect to model parameters θ
at each iteration t:
θt+1← θt −η ·∇ 1m
m
∑
i=1
L( fθ(xi),yi)
where η is the learning rate and controls the magnitude of
changes made at each iteration. When it is not feasible to
compute the empirical risk over the entire training set, one
samples a single example from the training set and uses it to
compute empirical risk and update the model. This variant
is known as stochastic gradient descent (SGD). To obtain
an unbiased estimate of the true gradient that would be com-
puted on the entire set [12], one may alternatively sample a
mini-batch, i.e., a small number of examples, (xt ,yt) from the
dataset at each iteration—rather than a single example or the
whole set: This learning procedure is called mini-batch SGD.
2.1 Data Poisoning
Data poisoning is a training-time attack which manipulates
a ML model’s behavior in favor of the attacker, by injecting
maliciously crafted samples, i.e., poisons, into the training set.
If a ML model is trained on the contaminated training set, an
attacker can prevent the trained model from generalizing well
to the test data or cause misclassifications of specific test-time
samples, i.e., targets, without degrading the generalization per-
formance of the trained model. The former attacks are known
as indiscriminate poisoning whereas the latter are referred
to as targeted poisoning. These attacks are highly effective
when an adversary cannot control the test-time samples, or
when an attacker is not able to alter the training procedures.
2.1.1 Poisoning Mechanisms
Adversaries exploit two mechanisms to trigger the intended
misclassifications: feature collisions and feature insertions.
• Feature Collision: An attacker can blend poisons such that a
victim model learns the opposite of what it would from clean
data. For example, the attacker can create poisons by just
flipping the label of a clean samples because both the clean
and poison samples have the same input space information. If
the victim trains a model on the poisoned training data, the in-
formation learned from the clean and poison samples contrast
each other. The indiscriminate attackers cause the collisions
to occur with the features useful for the classification of most
test-time samples, while the feature collisions happen locally
by the targeted attackers so that they cause misclassifications
on a small subset of testing samples.
• Feature Insertion: In addition, the attacker can make a vic-
tim model learn new latent representations useful for misclas-
sification. For instance, in image classification, the attacker
can identify the features (mostly in the input space) that com-
monly appear in the targets, but are not critical to classify the
target samples. The adversary can proceed to craft the poisons
to include those features, but with the label that the attacker
wants for the targets to be misclassified as. If a model trained
with the poisons encounters samples, and if it does not find
the features added by the adversary, the model classifies them
correctly, while the targets are classified into the attacker’s
label. Thus, the mechanism is useful for targeted poisoning.
2.1.2 Threat Model
In this subsection, we specify the threat model we operate in.
Capability: Our work assumes an attacker who cannot mod-
ify the victim model f and its parameters θ directly, or con-
trol/modify the training procedure Q to cause the misclassifi-
cation. We consider an attacker who can craft poisons offline
and blend them into the training data Dtr. More specifically,
we consider two scenarios: (1) the attacker blends poisons at
the beginning of the training phase, or (2) adds poisons when
the learner attempts to update the trained model. Thus, what
the attacker can control is (1) the number of poisons that will
be added to the training data, and (2) the time (or the training
stage) when the attacker decides to blend poisons.
Knowledge: Prior work [42] characterized the poisoning at-
tacker’s knowledge using four dimensions: (1) the training
data Dtr, (2) the subset of features the victim uses X , and
(3) the learning algorithm Q , and (4) the model parameters θ.
The black-box setting considers the attacker has no knowledge
about the four dimensions whereas in the white-box setting,
where the attacker knows all the four components, at least
partially. As we discuss defensive mechanisms against data
poisoning, we consider strong white-box attackers.
3 Poisoning Mechanisms and Gradients
In this section, we characterize the attack surface exploited
by data poisoning attacks through a systematic analysis of
gradients computed by training algorithms. Here, we focus
on the impact of the poisoning mechanisms that we specified
in §2.1.1 on the gradients computed during the training of a
model. Since the attacker cannot modify the victim model,
perturb its parameters, and control the training procedures
(specified in §2.1.2), the attacker cannot directly manipulate
the gradients computed on the poisons by the victim’s training
algorithm but can influence them through poisons. In contrast
to previous taxonomies structured around the knowledge and
capabilities of adversaries [42], our characterization provide
a unified perspective on data poisoning attacks in §4.
3.1 Experimental Setup and Methodology
In our analysis, we first craft a set of poisons that can cause
the feature collision (or feature insertion) during training.
We then train a model on the poisoned training set and store
the averaged gradients computed from the clean and poison
samples—i.e., the estimation of an individual gradient—over
an epoch. To compare the differences between the clean and
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Figure 1: Gradient Analysis Based on the Intensity of Poisoning Mechanisms. We illustrate the magnitude ratios (the upper
row) and the orientation differences (the lower row) during training in three scenarios: (1) an LR model is trained from scratch on
multiple poisons that cause feature collisions; (2) we re-train an MLP model on multiple poisons causing feature collisions; and
(3) the same MLP model is re-trained on 1% of poisons that cause feature insertion. Each column corresponds to each scenario.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 2: FashionMNIST Images Used in Our Gradient
Analysis. The upper row contains the interpolated samples
with different interpolation ratios α, and the bottom row shows
the samples with different sizes of additional features.
poison gradients, we compute: (1) the ratio of the magnitude
(in `2-norm) of the poison gradients to the clean gradients, and
(2) the orientation differences by using the cosine similarity
score. All our analysis were carried out on FashionMNIST1.
Poisons: We use the following techniques to craft poisons:
• Feature Collision: To cause the feature collision by poisons,
we use the watermarking technique. We randomly choose
the same number of samples from the two classes (i.e., dress
and coat) in the training set Dtr of FashionMNIST; for each
pair of a dress and coat images, we overlay the coat image
to the dress and label the resulting image still as a dress. We
control the intensity of feature collisions by modifying the
interpolation ratio α. In Figure 2, we show the poison samples
crafted with the different α in the upper row; the more we
overlay the coat image to the dress image, the more dissimilar
an interpolated image and its label (dress) become.
• Feature Insertion: To exploit the feature insertion by poi-
sons, we utilize backdooring mechanisms [21]. We first ran-
domly select 1% of the training samples from any class and
1More details on the datasets we used are described in §6.1
attach a small white-square in the top-left corner of each
image. We then assign the label coat for the patched im-
ages and add them to the training set. Here, we control the
intensity of feature insertion by increasing the patch size:
{1×1,4×4,7×7,10×10,14×14} as shown in the bottom
row of Figure 2. As the patch size increases, the model is
required to update its parameters more.
3.2 Gradient Analysis: Feature Collision
Here, we focus on two scenarios where (1) a model is trained
from scratch on the training set containing multiple poisons,
and (2) we update a trained model on the poisoned training
set. They represent common indiscriminate and targeted poi-
soning scenarios, respectively. In the first scenario, we train
a linear regression (LR) model on a subset of the FashionM-
NIST dataset. We use the Adam [24] optimizer and train the
model for 40 epochs with the batch size 300 and the learning
rate 0.01. The subset is a binary dataset comprising of sam-
ples from the dress and coat classes; the training set includes
10,800 samples (5,400 from each class), and the testing set
contains 2000 samples. We construct the poisoned training
set by adding 100 interpolated dress samples. In the second
scenario, we first train a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with
two hidden layers on the entire FashionMNIST dataset. We
then re-train the model on the poisoned training set contain-
ing the same 100 poisons. We use the SGD optimizer and
re-train the model for 20 epochs with the batch size 100 and
the learning rate 0.04.
The first and second columns in Figure 1 illustrate the re-
sults from our feature collision analysis. Overall, we observe
that the magnitude ratio between the gradients from individ-
ual poison and clean samples is high during training in both
the scenarios—i.e., the magnitude of poison gradients are
4
Goal Prior work Knowledge Capability Target PoisoningMechanism
Gradient differences
Dtr X Q fθ # Poisons Injection Task Model Magnitude Orientation
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Barreno et al. [8] M. Sc. Bi. Bayes - - -
Biggio et al. [10] M. Sc. Bi. SVM Collision High High
Zhao et al. [49] M. Sc. Bi. / Mc. SVM Collision High High
Steinhardt et al. [41] M. Sc. Bi. SVM Collision High High
Mun˜oz-González et al. [29] M. Sc. Bi. / Mc. LR Collision High High
Jagielski et al. [22] M. Sc. Bi. LR Collision High High
Ma et al. [28] M. Sc. Bi. Linear Collision High High
Ta
rg
et
ed
Barreno et al. [8] M. Sc. Bi. Bayes - - -
Suciu et al. [42] M. Re. / Sc. Mc. DNN Collision & Insertion High Unstable / High
Shafahi et al. [39] S. / M. Re. / Sc. Mc. DNN Collision & Insertion High Unstable / High
Zhu et al. [50] S. / M. Re. / Sc. Mc. DNN Collision & Insertion High Unstable / High
Knowledge: = Black-box, = White-box, = Both # Poisons: S. = Single-Poison, M. = Multi-Poison
Injection: Sc. = From Scratch, Re. = From Re-training Target Task: Bi. = Binary classification, Mc. = Multi-class classification
Table 1: Unifying Data Poisoning Attacks. We listed indiscriminate attacks at the top half while targeted attacks are at the
bottom half. From the left, the columns 3-6 contains the attacker’s knowledge considered by authors, and we specify the capability
of an attacker in the columns 7-8. We include the target tasks and models used in the columns 9-10. In the columns 11-13, we
identify the poisoning mechanism used in each work and the shared differences expected to be seen in the gradients.
larger than that of clean gradients. We also found the ratio
becomes larger when we re-train a model with the same poi-
sons; in this case, the model already has learned about the
clean samples so the gradients computed from the clean data
are smaller than the poison gradients. In terms of the orienta-
tion differences, we can see the cosine similarity scores are
less than zero in both cases. This indicates the features are
colliding—i.e., the information from the poison gradients is
in contrast to that from the clean ones. Moreover, we iden-
tified that, as the intensity of the feature collision increases,
the magnitude ratio and orientation difference become more
stable and visible. For instance, in the first scenario, the case
of α=1.0 shows fewer oscillations of the magnitude ratio and
cosine similarity score than the α=0.1 case. In the re-training
scenario, when α approaches one, the ratio increases, and the
cosine similarity gets closer to minus one.
3.3 Gradient Analysis: Feature Insertion
In targeted poisoning, an attacker can also exploit the feature
insertion to cause local misclassifications on a few target
samples. Since the feature insertion is useful against the re-
training of a high-capacity model such as a neural network,
we consider the scenario where the victim updates an MLP
model on the poisoned training set. We take the MLP model
in §3.2, trained on the entire FashionMNIST, and construct
the poisoned training set by adding 1% of patched samples to
the original (clean) training set. We then re-train the model
on the poisoned training set for 20 epochs by using the SGD
optimizer with the batch size 100 and the learning rate 0.01.
The last column in Figure 1 shows the results from our
feature insertion analysis. In the earlier epochs, we found
similar patterns to the results in §3.2, there is a significant
difference in the magnitude of the gradients computed from
the poisons and clean samples. However, we can also see
the differences that we observed in the earlier epochs are
reduced during training and, at the end of the re-training, both
the magnitude ratio and cosine similarity become closer to
zero. This implies that the model learns the new features
coming from our poisons during re-training with minimal
collisions with the existing features; thus, the attacker can
cause misclassifications of the test-time samples including the
new features without hurting the model’s original behaviors.
4 Unifying Data Poisoning Attacks
In this section, we unify the attack surface exploited by data
poisoning attacks based on our analysis of their impact on the
magnitude ratio and orientation differences between the clean
and poison gradients. We start with an overview of the exist-
ing data poisoning attacks based on the taxonomy structured
around the knowledge and capability of an attacker [42]. We
then focus on poisoning mechanisms that the indiscriminate
or targeted attacks use and identify shared features that can be
observed in the magnitude ratio and orientation differences.
Building on this intuition, we lay out essential properties for
a generic defense against poisoning attacks.
4.1 Indiscriminate Poisoning Attacks
Overview of Existing Attacks: In Table 1, we listed the in-
discriminate attacks at the top half. Most (not all) work [8,10,
22,28,29,41,49] has focused on attacking simple models such
as linear regression (LR) models or support vector machines
(SVMs) in the binary classification setting (the columns 9-
10). Mun˜oz-González et al. [29] performed attacks on neural
networks; however, they turned out to be ineffective as the
accuracy drop caused was less than 1%. In the columns 3-6,
we can see the indiscriminate attacks that consider the white-
box attacker who knows the training data Dtr, the features
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X , the model fθ, and the training algorithm Q . Using this
knowledge, they craft poisons that can maximize the test-time
loss (or the training loss as a proxy for the test-time loss [41]).
This crafting process is commonly formulated as an optimiza-
tion problem, the attacker first chooses several samples from
Dtr and finds perturbations to their features X . The solution
is obtained through gradient descent methods by exploiting
the knowledge about the target model fθ and training algo-
rithm Q . Some scenarios consider limited knowledge of an
attacker about the training data or the target model [22,29,49];
however, the attacker can exploit transferability to compute
poisons by using auxiliary training data or surrogate models.
Estimated Impact on Gradients: To maximize the test-time
loss during training, the attacker needs to craft poisons that
cause the largest disturbance to the gradients computed from
the clean data. Hence, the indiscriminate attackers exploit
the feature collision (see column 11 in Table 1). As the main
purpose of the indiscriminate attack is to cause a significant
accuracy drop, the attacker increases the intensity of feature
collision by blending multiple poisons into the training set.
This scenario is similar to our analysis of feature collision in
§3.2 when we train an LR model on the binary training set
containing 100 poisons. Thus, we expect to observe a similar
magnitude ratio and orientation difference between the poi-
son and clean gradients across the indiscriminate poisoning
attacks—i.e., cosine similarity becomes -1, and the magnitude
ratio is high. We specify this intuition in the columns 12-13.
4.2 Targeted Poisoning Attacks
Overview of Existing Work: The bottom half of Table 1
shows the targeted attacks. Most work [39, 42, 50], except [8],
performed targeted attacks on large capacity models such
as deep neural networks (DNNs). In the columns 3-6, we
show that initial work on targeted poisoning [8] considers
the white-box attacker who knows Dtr, X , fθ, and Q ; how-
ever, the following work [39, 42] identified that an adversary
can perform effective attacks without the knowledge of the
training set Dtr. The most recent work [50] demonstrates the
successful attacks without knowing the target model fθ and
its training algorithm Q by exploiting the transferability of
poisons across different DNNs. In targeted poisoning, the at-
tacker crafts poisons using the test samples in the target class.
For example, if an attacker wants to misclassify a small subset
of dog images (targets) into fish, the attacker first picks a few
test samples in the fish class. In the creation process, the at-
tacker minimizes the distance between the poisons and targets
in the internal representation space of a model and the pertur-
bations in the input features X . This makes targeted attacks
inconspicuous—i.e., the poisons are perceptually indistin-
guishable to a human, but they affect the model’s decision
locally without a significant accuracy drop.
Estimated Impact on Gradients: To minimize the accuracy
drop caused by poisoning samples, a targeted attacker exploits
both the feature collision and insertion (see column 11 in Ta-
ble 1): (1) To cause the local misclassifications, the attacker
can cause collisions with the features important for the tar-
get classifications, but the model does not rely on them for
the entire classification. (2) On the other hand, the attacker
inserts new features to the target model and increases their
importance on the classification of targets in training. Con-
sidering that the targeted attacks were more successful when
the attacker blends poisons during the re-training of a victim
model, we expect to observe the magnitude ratio and orienta-
tion difference showed in §3.3—i.e., the ratio becomes high,
and the orientation differences become unstable or slightly
less than -1. However, as shown in Figure 1, cosine similarity
can decrease and become 0 when the attacker reduces the
intensity—the number of poisons—of both the mechanisms.
5 Mitigate Poisoning with Gradient Shaping
The unified view of data poisoning attacks in §4 outlines a se-
ries of requirements for effective defenses. Here, we introduce
gradient shaping, a property for anti-poison defenses, that sat-
isfies these requirements. Using this property, we taxonomize
the existing defenses against data poisoning attacks and dis-
cuss the effectiveness and limits of those mechanisms. We
then instantiate a defense by leveraging differentially private
(DP) optimizers and demonstrate its effectiveness in §6.
5.1 Gradient Shaping
Our unified view of data poisoning provides two key insights.
During training, (1) the `2-norm of an individual gradient
from poison is larger than the norm of a clean gradient on
average, and (2) there is an orientation difference between the
poison and clean gradients. While the extent of both the ob-
servations varies depending on the intensity of an attack, they
are common across data poisoning attacks. Given that poison
gradients update the model at each batch, the total change in
model parameters is exacerbated over training epochs.
Gradient Shaping: By controlling both the magnitude ratio
and orientation difference of the gradients, we could intu-
itively safeguard ML models against data poisoning attacks.
We refer to this property as gradient shaping. Any defense
mechanism is used to minimize the differences in gradients
before the model uses them to update its parameters. In Fig-
ure 3, we illustrate how this property reduces the differences
in gradients during the training of a model with poisons in
the context of indiscriminate attacks. When we train a model
on the poisoned training set, we compute clean gradients (the
green lines in the figure) and the poison gradients (the red
lines in the figure) at each iteration. We sum the two gradients
and update the model parameters.
If the data does not include poisons, the training algorithms
updates the model parameters following the trajectory shown
in the green dashed-lines—i.e., it updates the parameters in
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Clean gradient descent
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Gradient from poisons w/o gradient shaping
Optimal model parameters
Initialization of model parameters Gradient descent w. gradient shaping
High loss
Medium loss
Low loss
Gradient from poisons w. gradient shaping
Figure 3: Illustration of How Gradient Shaping Mitigates
Poisoning. This is a contour line visualization of the model’s
loss for different values of its parameters; each arrow cor-
responds to the gradients computed from poisons or clean
samples, each dashed arrow indicates the step taken when
computing a single model update, and each dot is a set of pa-
rameters obtained after one or more steps of gradient descent
from the random initialization. This abstract representation
helps understand how the property mitigates data poisoning.
the direction of reducing loss. However, when the data con-
tains poisons, the updates at each iteration are affected by the
poison gradients (see the red dashed-lines). Thus, the model
parameters land on the surface with high loss, which leads to
the accuracy drop of the trained model. If gradient shaping is
used, the magnitude and orientation differences between the
poison and clean gradients are reduced (see the brown lines).
In this case, the updates of the model parameters deviate less,
following the trajectory illustrated in the brown dashed-lines,
and land on the surface with low loss.
5.2 Existing Poisoning Defenses
Table 2 outlines defenses against poisoning. Prior work [8,15,
22,41,42] focused primarily on outlier removal (also known as
data sanitization). In outlier removal, the defender considers
outliers as poisons and removes them from the training data,
which meets the requirements of gradient shaping as it clears
away the poison gradients by removing a set of poisons.
However, outlier removal is brittle: they identify poisons
based on analysis of nearest neighbors, training loss, and di-
mensionality reduction techniques—all of which are depen-
dent on the training data Dtr and/or the model fθ and its
parameters θ. Worse so, when the attack uses inconspicuous
poisons, e.g., targeted poisoning, it is difficult to detect them
by the sanitization techniques [6]; as witnessed in the abun-
dant work in evasion attacks [19], malicious samples with
similar input representations often produce distinctly differ-
ent gradients. An extended version of the RONI defense called
tRONI [42] examines the misclassification of targets during
training; however, tRONI assumes a defender knows the tar-
gets that an attacker wishes to misclassify. Moreover, outlier
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RONI [8] OR I 3 7 7 3
Certified Defense [41] OR I 3 3 7 3
TRIM [22] OR I 3 3 7 3
SEVER [15] OR I 3 3 7 3
tRONI [42] OR T 3 7 3 3
Ours DP I & T 7 7 7 7
Attacks: I = Indiscriminate, T = Targeted
Mechanism: OR = Outlier Removal, DP = DP Optimizers
Table 2: An Overview of Existing Poisoning Defenses2.
removal scales poorly as it increases the computational over-
heads during training. They require an iterative analysis of
the training samples [8, 22, 41, 42] or rely on robust optimiza-
tions [15] using higher-order derivatives. Approaches from
robust optimization could indeed apply here, but they were
found by Jagielski et al. to perform poorly in the presence of
adversary-induced poisoning [22].
5.3 Generic Defense: DP Optimizers
Recall that the requirements for an effective anti-poison de-
fense include (1) controlling the norm of the poison gradient,
and (2) restricting differences in the orientation between the
poison and clean gradients. Similar requirements are needed
to ensure that learning algorithms train a model privately.
We adopt the differential privacy framework, which can be
thought of as requiring that the model updates are not influ-
enced overly by any of the individual examples contained
in the training data. Abadi et al. [5] propose a differentially
private mechanism for off-the-shelf optimizers, e.g., SGD
(henceforth referred to as DP optimizers). By choosing a
pre-defined clipping norm, they bound the influence of an
individual gradient to a model. Also, they proceed to make
the gradients indistinguishable by adding Gaussian noise (see
Algorithm 1 in Appendix B). Thus, we utilizes DP optimizers
to meet the requirements for an effective anti-poison defense.
The key advantage of using DP optimizers is that they are
generic mechanisms agnostic to the dataset and model used
by a defender, and the techniques used to craft poisons (see
Table 2). In subsequent sections, we validate these points.
Out-of-Scope: DP optimizers are designed to control the
privacy leakage (ε), often at a significant cost in model util-
ity [23]. Instead, we focus on how certain parameter configu-
rations of DP optimizers can defend against poisoning with
minimal utility loss, regardless of the privacy provided.
2Ma et al. [28] considers differential privacy [17] to provide theoretical
bounds on the number of poisons that a model can resist during training.
However, we exclude this work from our taxonomy as the bound was evalu-
ated on synthetic attacks, not the poisoning attacks in recent literature.
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6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of training a
model with DP optimizers as a defense against data poisoning
attacks. We start with an overview of our experimental setup
(§6.1). We then quantify the resilience of training a model
with DP optimizers against indiscriminate (§6.2) and targeted
poisoning attacks (§6.3 and §6.4). In experiments, we indi-
vidually vary the two parameters—the clipping norm C and
the noise multiplier σ—for each attack, to analyze the impact
of parameter configurations on the resilience. To understand
the impact of a specific parameter choice, we compare the
magnitude ratio and orientation difference between the poison
and clean gradients observed in the training without DP opti-
mizers and those seen when we use them. Moreover, we turn
our attention to distinct defense scenarios where the resilience
of a model itself is necessary (§6.5).
6.1 Experimental Setup
Our analysis framework quantifies the effectiveness of using
DP optimizers against data poisoning attacks. Given an attack,
the framework crafts poisons, trains multiple models using the
specified training algorithms (SGD/Adam or DP-SGD/DP-
Adam) with the poisoned training set, and reports the metrics
that we define. We build this framework using Python 3.73
and TensorFlow 1.14.0. To train a model with DP optimizers,
we use the open-source library, TensorFlow-Privacy [4].
Datasets: We conduct our analysis with three datasets:
Purchase-100 [1], FashionMNIST [46], and CIFAR-10 [25].
Purchase-100 consists of 200k customer purchase records of
size 100 each (corresponding to the 100 frequently purchased
items), and the records are categorized into 100 classes based
on the customers’ purchase style. Here, we use 10k randomly-
chosen records for training and 10k randomly-selected non-
training samples for the test set [23]. FashionMNIST is com-
posed of 28x28 grayscale images of 70k fashion products
from 10 categories, with 7k images per class, which contains
60k training and 10k testing samples. CIFAR-10 includes
32x32 pixels, colored natural images of 10 classes, containing
50k training and 10k testing samples.
Models: We consider a logistic regression (LR), a multi-layer
perceptron (MLP), and a convolutional neural network (CNN).
We include the network configurations that we used in Ap-
pendix C. For Purchase-100, we use LR and MLP models;
however, for the FashionMNIST and CIFAR10, we use MLP
and CNN models because the LR models have poor accuracy
(< 50%) on the test set. In all figures and discussion of results,
we add the prefix vanilla- and DP- to denote models trained
with SGD and DP-SGD respectively.
Metrics: Since the indiscriminate attacker aims to cause sig-
nificant accuracy drop of a model over the test set, we utilize
the relative accuracy drop (RAD) to measure the attacker’s
success. RAD is the accuracy drop of a model caused by poi-
soning over the accuracy of the clean model—the larger the
RAD, more effective the attack. For targeted poisoning, we
consider an attack to be successful when the target becomes
misclassified at any epoch during re-training without causing
significant accuracy degradation. Specifically, successful at-
tacks are those where RAD < 0.05, the same threshold used
by Suciu et al. [42]. Moreover, we measure the attack inten-
sity as the number of poisons added to the clean training set.
For indiscriminate attacks, we denote the intensity as a ratio
of the number of poisons to the number of clean samples. In
targeted attacks, the intensity is the number of poisons.
6.2 Mitigating Indiscriminate Poisoning
Experimental Methodology: Indiscriminate poisoning is
known to be effective against binary classification tasks that
utilize linear models [8, 10, 22, 30, 41]; thus, we focus our
analysis on the LR models trained on the subset of Fashion-
MNIST used in §3.2. Our analysis considers two attacks: (1)
the random label-flipping [8] (LF) that manipulates the labels
of clean samples, and (2) the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attack
formulated by Steinhardt et al. [41]. For each attack, we first
construct the poisoned training sets that include varying num-
ber of poisons synthesized using one of the attacks specified
above. On each poisoned training set, we train models with
DP-Adam using different clipping norms and noise multipli-
ers and compare their RAD with that of the vanilla-model.
Figure 4 illustrates the RAD of the LR models con-
structed using the above methodology. We display (1) the
results from the random LF attacks in the upper row, and (2)
the results from the SOTA attacks in the bottom row. For
our analysis with DP-Adam, we choose the clipping norm
from {8.0,4.0,2.0,1.0,0.1} and the noise multiplier from
{10−1,10−2,10−3,10−5,10−6,10−7}3. The batch size and
the learning rate are fixed to 300 and 0.01 respectively, and
we train a model over 40 epochs. For each model, we increase
the intensity of our attacks by blending 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20,
30, and 40% of poisons like [41]. For the vanilla-models, we
observe that the RAD caused by the SOTA attack (∼0.19) is
significantly higher than the random LF attack (∼0.03). We
also observe that when the attackers blend more poisons, the
trained model generally suffers from a larger RAD.
Impact of the Clipping Norm: We first examined whether
using only the clipping norm can reduce the success of an
indiscriminate attack, as using the noise multiplier causes the
utility loss of a model. We found that setting the clipping norm
to a particular value in [2.0, 8.0] can reduce RAD caused
by random LF attacks by 2×. Figure 4a shows the RAD of
DP-models trained on the data containing different numbers
3We use these clipping norms since the median value of parameter updates
observed during the training of a model lies in that range (as recommended
by Abadi et al. [5]). Once we identify which clipping norm provides the
best resilience, we examine noise multipliers that do not cause an accuracy
drop more than 10% of the model trained with the clipping norm.
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of Training Models with DP Optimizers against Indiscriminate Poisoning Attacks. We illustrate
the RADs of the vanilla- and DP-models in the random LF attacks (upper) and the SOTA attacks (lower). We show that training
with DP-Adam is effective in mitigating the random LF attacks whereas DP-Adam cannot defeat the SOTA attacks. In the right
column, we also show the magnitude difference as a ratio between poison and clean gradients in both the attacks.
of poisons from the random LF attacks. The DP-models have
smaller RAD than vanilla-models. In particular, we achieve
the lowest RAD when the clipping norm is 4.0—the DP-
model trained with 40% of poisons has 0.011 (RAD) whereas
the vanilla-model shows 0.028 (RAD). We also examine the
clipping norms in {1.0,0.1}; however, they could not achieve
a RAD smaller than 0.011.
In contrast, we observed that using the clipping norm can-
not reduce the RAD of a model caused by the SOTA attacks.
Figure 4d shows the DP-models trained with the clipping
norm in [4.0, 8.0] could not lead to a smaller RAD in all the
attacks. Also, when we use the smaller clipping norm 2.0,
the RAD of the DP-models becomes worse than that of the
vanilla-models. Training with 40% of poisons, the RAD of
the DP-model is 0.217 whereas that of the vanilla-model is
0.178. To understand why DP optimizers are ineffective in
the SOTA attacks, we conduct an extensive analysis in §7.
Impact of the Noise Multiplier: Here, we evaluate whether
combining the noise multipliers with a particular choice of
clipping norm can reduce the RAD caused by the attacks
further than individually using the parameters. We set the clip-
ping norm to 4.0—the best setting found from our analysis—
and vary the noise between {10−1,10−3,10−5,10−7}. Fig-
ure 4b and 4e show that a defender could not benefit from
combining the noise multiplier with a specific clipping norm.
In the random LF attacks, the DP-models shows more RAD
when we combine the noise multipliers and the clipping norm
4.0 than the models trained without the noise. In the SOTA
attacks, using the noise multiplier could not provide any ben-
efit for the defender as the RAD of the DP-models is similar
to that of the vanilla-models. We revisit this in §7.
Impact on the Gradients: In §4.1, we identified that indis-
criminate poisoning attacks induce contrasting magnitude and
orientations between the gradients from poisons and clean
samples during training. Hence, for the attack cases where
using the clipping norm is an effective defense, the magnitude
and orientation differences in training has to be reduced. We
found that is the case. In Figure 4c and 4f, we compare the
magnitude differences observed in the training of the vanilla-
and DP-model with 40% of poisons from both the random LF
and SOTA attacks. We set the clipping norm to 4.0. For the
random LF attack, we observe the magnitude ratio decreases
when the clipping norm is used; on average, the ratio is 2.527
in the vanilla-model and 2.221 in the DP-model. However, in
the SOTA attack, the ratio becomes higher in the DP-model
(3.645) than what we see in the vanilla-model (2.497). This
implies that the magnitude of poison gradients is smaller in
the DP-model than that in the vanilla-model; thus, during
training of a model with DP optimizers, the influence of poi-
sons on the model is less than that in the vanilla training.
6.3 Mitigating Targeted Poisoning
Experimental Methodology: We evaluate the effectiveness
of our defense against the realistic, worst-case targeted at-
tacker formulated by [39]. This attack considers the white-
box adversary who has the full knowledge of the target model
and its parameters. By exploiting this internal information,
the attacker becomes inconspicuous, but effective—i.e., the
adversary crafts poisons perceptually indistinguishable by a
human but can cause misclassification on targets with small
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Figure 5: Effectiveness of Training with DP Optimizers against the One-shot (Targeted) Poisoning. We illustrate the RADs
(solid lines) and the attack success rate (dashed lines) of the DP-models trained with the different choice of DP-SGD parameters.
In the upper row, we only use the clipping norm whereas we vary the noise in the bottom row when the clipping norm is fixed. In
the shaded area, we find DP-SGD configurations that reduces the attack success rate by half with a RAD of 0.1.
number of poisons, e.g., a single poison. Moreover, the attack
does not modify the original label of poisons (clean-label).
This is currently considered a worst-case attack because such
inconspicuous poisons are difficult to be filtered out by using
the existing outlier-based defenses in §5.2. To maximize the
influence of poisons on a model, the attacker blends them into
the training set used for re-training of the model. We denote
the case where the attacker uses a single poison as one-shot
and multi-poison when they use multiple.
To evaluate our defense comprehensively, we attack 100
test-time samples in a specific class, and for each target, we
choose 100 other testing samples in another class close to the
target in the penultimate layer’s representation space as can-
didates for crafting poisons. Our attacker has computational
constraints4: (1) as the poison crafting is an optimization pro-
cedure, we bound the attacker within 10k iterations, and (2)
during this optimization, we only use the poisons in a specific
proximity of the target in the representation space—i.e., an `2
distance of 3.5. During the attacks, we consider the one-shot
attack to be successful when any one of the poisons lead to
the misclassification on a target with RAD ≤ 0.05, and the
multi-poison attack is successful when a set of poisons cause
misclassification. We define the attack success rate as a ratio
of the number of misclassified targets over the total 100.
Figure 5 shows the success rate of the one-shot poisoning
attacks and the RAD caused by training with DP-SGD in
three different models (LR, MLP and CNN) trained using
Purchase-100, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR-10 respectively.
During our training of a model with DP-SGD, we use the clip-
4We choose the same constraints as what is used in Shafahi et al. [39].
ping norm in {8.0,4.0,2.0,1.0,0.1} and the noise multiplier
in {0.001,0.01,0.1,0.4,0.8,1.0,2.0,4.0}. The batch size is
fixed to 100, and we use the learning rate 0.08 for the LR
and MLP models and 0.02 for CNN models. We first train a
model from scratch on the clean training set for 100 epochs
and then re-train the same model for 50 epoch with the same
training set containing poisons. Since using the noise multi-
plier decreases a model’s utility, we first examine the impact
of the clipping norm by setting the noise multiplier to zero.
Then, we fix the clipping norm to a specific value and repeat
the same set of analyses while varying the noise multiplier.
Impact of the Clipping Norm: We observe that setting the
clipping norm to a small value can decrease the success rate
of the one-shot poisoning attack significantly. This result is
consistent with our intuition in §3.2; since the attacker exploits
feature collision locally, the magnitude difference between the
poison and clean gradients becomes high, and the orientation
difference oscillates during re-training. Thus, suppressing
the parameter updates from the poison by setting the clipping
norm can be an effective defense. In the LR models trained on
Purchase-100, using the clipping norm 0.1 reduces the attack
success rate from 46.58% to 9.33% with RAD < 0.1. For the
MLP models trained on FashionMNIST, we also observe that
the attacker’s success rate decreases to 1.33% with a RAD of
0.04 when we use the clipping norm of 1.0. Moreover, in the
CNN models trained on CIFAR-10, setting the clipping norm
to 0.1 also reduces the success rate by more than 2×—from
50.00% to 21.00%. However, we sacrifice the model’s utility
0.48 in RAD to achieve the resilience.
Impact of the NoiseMultiplier: Our previous analysis raises
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of Training with DP Optimizers against the Multi-Poison (Targeted) Attacks. We illustrate the
success rate of the attacker (solid lines), the averaged number of required poisons for a successful attack (dotted lines), and the
RADs (dashed lines) of the DP-models trained with the difference choices of DP-SGD/Adam parameters on Purchase-100.
a question: can we achieve better resilience with the same
RAD by combining the noise multiplier? To answer this ques-
tion, we choose the clipping norm from our analysis results
and examine different noise multipliers. The results are shown
in the second row of Figure 5. We found that combining the
noise multiplier with a specific value of the clipping norm
reduces the attacker’s success rate further with RAD < 0.1.
In Purchase-100, we use the noise multiplier 0.01 with the
clipping norm 4.0, and we decrease the success rate of the
attacker to 8.97%. We achieve 0% attack success rate with
the clipping norm 2.0 and the noise multiplier 0.8 in Fash-
ionMNIST. In CIFAR-10, using only the clipping norm 0.1,
we can reduce the attacker’s success rate by 2×, but we lose
the model’s utility by 0.48 in RAD. However, when we use
the noise multiplier 0.4, the attacker’s success rate drops to
21.21%, similar to the results by using only the clipping norm,
but the utility loss is much smaller (0.15 in RAD).
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Figure 7: Gradient-level Differences in One-shot Attacks.
We compare the magnitude ratio and orientation difference
seen in re-training (Purchase-100). For the same target, the
attack succeeds with SGD and fails when we use DP-SGD.
Impact on the Gradients in Training: Here, we conduct an
analysis of the impact of re-training with DP-SGD on the mag-
nitude ratio and orientation difference. If the DP-SGD is an
effective anti-poison defense against the one-shot attacks, the
magnitude ratio becomes smaller and the orientation differ-
ence is stabilized when we re-train a model with the optimizer.
Figure 7 illustrates our analysis results. We compare the mag-
nitude ratios between the re-training process with SGD and
that with DP-SGD in the upper plot; the orientation differ-
ences are shown in the lower plot. For DP-SGD, we use the
clipping norm 4.0 and the noise multiplier 0.1.
We found that re-training of a model with DP-SGD reduces
the magnitude ratios between the poison and clean gradients
and stabilizes the orientation differences. The magnitude ra-
tios decrease from 7.46 to 1.14 on average over 50 epochs.
Also, the standard deviation of the orientation differences seen
in the successful attack is 0.073, whereas the value becomes
0.01 when we use DP-SGD during re-training.
6.4 Mitigating Multi-Poison Attacks
In this subsection, we extend our previous analysis by con-
ducting the multi-poison attacks on the LR and MLP models
trained on Purchase-100. Figure 6 illustrates our results: we
show (1) the attacker’s success rate, (2) the number of poi-
sons required for a successful attack on average, and (3) the
RAD of a model caused by DP-SGD. We use the same set of
clipping norms and noise multipliers as in §6.3.
Impact of the Clipping Norm: We found that setting the
clipping norm to a small value increases the number of re-
quired poisons for an successful attack with RAD < 0.05, but
this could not reduce the success rate of the attack. First, in
Figure 6a, we can see the attacker consistently achieves a
success rate over 94.67% in all the clipping norms. However,
we found that the number of required poisons on average
increases from 1.08 up to 5.43 as we decrease the clipping
norm from 8.0 to 0.1, with the small amount of utility loss
(0.011 in RAD). We also examine the clipping norms smaller
than 0.1—i.e., 0.4 and 0.01; nevertheless, they do not provide
more benefits to a defender. The number of required poisons
for an attack saturates, and the utility loss starts to increase.
Impact of the Noise Multiplier: Can we reduce the suc-
cess rate of the attacker by combining the noise multiplier
with a specific value of the clipping norm? To answer this
question, we repeat the same experiments with the fixed clip-
ping norm (4.0) and vary the noise multipliers. Figure 6b
11
and 6c illustrates our results in LR and MLP models trained
on Purchase-100. We found that using the noise multiplier
with the clipping norm is helpful to reduce the attack suc-
cess rate and to increase the number of required poisons for
an successful attack, but this comes with the significant util-
ity loss. In the LR models with the noise multiplier 0.4, the
attacker’s success rate becomes 7.14%, and the number of
required poisons is 27.50. In the MLP models, when we use
the noise multiplier 1.0, we make the success rate of the at-
tacker 0%. However, in both cases, the utility loss of the LR
and MLP models are 0.748 and 0.612 in RAD respectively.
Impact on the Gradients in Training: DP-SGD works as
a defense by clipping the norm of an individual gradient
and adding Gaussian noise to it (see Algorithm 1). Hence,
the multi-poison attacker can neutralize the impact of the
clipping norm by using multiple poisons. Contrary to the one-
shot attack where each batch includes at-most one poison, the
multi-poison attack enforces each batch to contain more than
one poison. Even if each poison gradient is bounded by a
small clipping norm, the influence of total poison gradients to
the model parameter updates during training can be sufficient
to cause a successful attack.
To decrease the success rate of the multi-poison attacker,
we need to set the noise multiplier. The noise added to each
gradient prevents the gradients computed from multiple poi-
sons orienting towards a similar direction. Thus, their sum in
re-training is insufficient to cause the misclassification. This is
also true that the attacker can neutralize the noise by blending
multiple poisons—i.e., the expected sum of the noise added
to each gradient is zero; however, due to the randomness, the
number of required poisons to remove the noise is a lot more
than what the attacker needs to evade the clipping norm.
6.5 Distinct Defense Scenarios
In this section, we consider the distinct defense scenarios
such as transfer learning cases where a defender can only use
DP-SGD in the specific stage of the training process.
Re-training a Vanilla-Model with DP-SGD: This happens
when a defender cannot train a model from scratch. For exam-
ple, it is difficult to train a large model [45] from scratch with
DP-SGD as the training takes a week on a super-computer
Attack Base Model Re-train Success Rate # Poisons
One-Shot
Vanilla w/o DP 46.58% (34/73) 1
Vanilla w. DP 17.81% (13/73) 1
DP-Model w/o DP 16.67% (13/78) 1
Multi-poison
Vanilla w/o DP 100.0% (73/73) 1.79
Vanilla w. DP 61.64% (45/73) 2.47
DP-Model w/o DP 100.0% (78/78) 3.47
Table 3: Effectiveness of Gradient Shaping in Distinct De-
fense Scenarios. For each attack, we show the success rate
and the number of required poisons for a successful attack.
cluster. Considering such a scenario, we evaluate whether
re-training of a vanilla-model with DP-SGD on the poisoned
training set can be resilient against the targeted attacks.
We take the vanilla LR model trained on Purchase-100
and re-train the model using two methods: (1) we continue
to train with Adam or (2) use DP-Adam with the clipping
norm 4.0 and the noise multiplier 0.01. During re-training, we
perform both the one-shot and multi-poison attacks. Table 3
shows the attacker’s success rate and the number of required
poisons for a successful attack. We found that a defender
can make the re-training of a vanilla model resilient against
targeted poisoning by using DP optimizers. In the one-shot
attack, the success rate decreased from 46.58% to 17.81%. In
the multi-poison attack, the attacker’s success rate decreased
from 100.00% to 61.64%, and the number of required poisons
increased from 1.79 to 2.47, which shows better resilience
than the cases in §6.4.
Re-training a DP-Model with SGD: We now direct our at-
tention to the scenario where we re-train a DP-model with
DP-Adam on the poisoned training data. Here, we take the
DP-LR model trained on Purchase-100 using the same clip-
ping norm and noise multiplier and re-train the model using
Adam. During re-training, we perform the one-shot and multi-
poison attacks. Our results is in Table 3. We observe that when
a model trained with DP is re-trained with vanilla optimizer,
the model becomes resilient against targeted poisoning even
if we do not use our defense during re-training. The one-shot
attacker’s success rate on the model re-trained with Adam is
16.67% whereas the same attacks are 46.58% successful when
we re-train a vanilla-model with Adam. In the multi-poison
cases, the success rate of the attack does not decrease, but
the number of required poisons are 3.47 on average, which is
higher than the vanilla-model case (1.79). This result implies
that when a defender distributes a teacher model for transfer
learning, it is safer to train the model with a DP optimizer. To
understand this resilience, we analyze the decision boundary
of a DP-model and include the discussion in Appendix D.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the scenarios where DP optimiz-
ers become ineffective. Our previous analysis identified that:
(1) training an LR model with DP-Adam cannot mitigate the
attacks formulated by Steinhardt et al. [41] (§6.2), and (2)
setting the noise multipliers to a high value accompanies a
significant utility loss of a trained model (§6.4). We conduct
analysis of those cases to understand the limits of DP optimiz-
ers when we use them as a mechanism for realizing gradient
shaping and discuss potential improvements to address them.
7.1 Case Study: Steinhardt’s Attack
We compare the distribution of poison samples to understand
why we cannot defeat the SOTA attack. We found that the
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Figure 8: Distribution of Clean Data and Poisons of the
Indiscriminate Attacks. We visualize the clean data and
poisons from the random LF and SOTA [41] attacks in §6.2.
On the left, we show two poisons used in the SOTA attack.
SOTA attack uses unrealistic poisons that can exploit the
weakness of linear models. Figure 8 shows the distribution
differences between the clean and poison samples from the
random LF and SOTA attacks. With the 10,800 clean sam-
ples and 4,320 (40%) poisons from each attack, we perform
principal component analysis (PCA) [31] to reduce the dimen-
sion and then use KMeans [2] on the 2-dimensional data for
clustering. In the figure, we observe that the poisons from the
SOTA attack are unrealistic; they consists of the same 3,970
coat samples (a single point in the left) and 350 dress samples
in two types (two points in the right). When we train an LR
model on this data, the model first fits its decision boundary
that splits the poisons well and then adjusts the boundary
to classify clean samples (see Appendix E for details). Con-
trarily, the 4,320 poisons from the random LF attack have
the similar distribution to the clean samples; thus, the model
trained on the data can learn its boundary from the majority
of clean samples and become resilient to the poisons.
7.2 Case Study: Multi-Poison Attack
Our analysis of the multi-poison attacks §6.4 shows that a de-
fender can reduce the success rate of the attacker and increase
the number of required poisons by setting the noise multiplier
to a high value. However, this results in a significant utility
loss of a trained model. This is because DP-SGD consistently
adds the same amount of noise to the gradients computed
from clean samples and poisons during training whereas gra-
dient’s magnitudes become smaller as a model learns about
the training data. To solve this problem, the amount of noise
added to each gradient should be proportional to its magni-
tude. One simple solution is to monitor the average `2-norm
of an individual gradient in the previous epoch and adjust the
amount of noise. Since we take the averaged magnitude of
an individual gradient, the attacker, who attempts to adapt
to our solution, would have to manipulate a large fraction
of the data to influence the noise multiplier. However, this
solution incurs computational overheads, and the mechanism
does not provide the privacy guarantee anymore. We leave
this research direction—to come up with an ideal mechanism
that realizes gradient shaping—as future work.
8 Related Work
Gradient Regularization as a Defense Prior work, espe-
cially in the context of neural networks, has proposed impos-
ing regularization penalties on a model’s gradients to improve
the accuracy [16], interpretability [33] or robustness against
adverarial examples [27]. In contrast to our threat model, by
explicitly penalizing the input gradients, these mechanisms
aim to regulate the test-time predictions, while assuming
a clean training set. We propose gradient shaping against
training-time attacks to suppress the adverse gradient sig-
natures poisons produce during training. Further, gradient
penalties rely on computationally restrictive “double back-
propagation”, whereas we implement gradient shaping with a
more efficient DP-SGD mechanism.
Model Poisoning Attacks against Machine Learning: In
the context of distributed learning scenarios, such as federated
learning, recent work has proposed model poisoning attacks
that directly manipulate the parameter updates (gradients) end-
hosts send to the shared model [7,9,11,48]. These attacks have
been considered effective when the attacker and the victim
interactively train a model. Model poisoning is out-of-scope
for our work because in the poisoning attacks we consider,
the adversary manipulates the training set, not the gradients.
Privacy Attacks in Machine Learning: Due to the high
capacity of machine learning models, especially neural net-
works, models trained on private data, such as health-care
or face datasets, may potentially leak sensitive information
about their training sets. Prior work [13,18,37,40] has demon-
strated attackers who aim to extract sensitive information from
trained models. DP-SGD [5] is developed as a tool to protect
the model from these attacks by clipping and adding noise to
the gradients during training. We use DP-SGD as an exemplar
tool to demonstrate the feasibility of gradient shaping as a
defense against data poisoning attacks.
9 Conclusions
This work tackles data poisoning in machine learning with a
unifying view of the threat landscape. We focus on a common
element of all poisoning attacks: they manipulate gradients
computed during training to update models. We identified
two main artifacts shared by various forms of poisoning—
(1) gradients computed on poisoned data have significantly
higher magnitudes than their counterparts on clean data, and
(2) their orientations also differ. Building on this analysis,
we next introduced gradient shaping—the prerequisite for an
attack-agnostic defense to poisoning—that bounds gradient
magnitudes and minimizes angular differences. Gradient shap-
ing allows us to move towards a generic defense, in contrast
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to prior defenses that exploit attack-specific properties or rely
on the identification of points that were poisoned. To study
the feasibility of gradient shaping, we consider DP-SGD—a
natural candidate algorithm for training with gradient shaping
because it clips and perturbs the gradients to provide privacy
guarantees. Our experiments with DP-SGD show that it re-
duces the model’s accuracy drop in the presence of indiscrimi-
nate attacks, mitigates one-shot targeted attacks, and increases
the adversary’s cost in multi-poison targeted attacks. We also
observed that DP-SGD becomes ineffective against a strong,
yet unrealistic, indiscriminate attack. This highlights design-
ing an effective gradient shaping mechanism is a promising
direction towards an ideal poisoning defense.
Availability
Our code is available under an open-source license from:
https://github.com/Sanghyun-Hong/Gradient-Shaping.
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Appendix
A Intuition Behind Our Gradient-Analysis
Discussion Related to §5.2: There is a limitation in char-
acterizing the goodness of a set of parameters computed by
the gradient descent sorely based on the value of the training
loss. Because the training objective for a neural network is
non-convex, there exists multiple local minima with associ-
ated losses taking values comparable to the global minimum,
denoted as the blue pentagon in Figure 9. In the benign set-
ting, all of these local minima correspond to models with
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Figure 9: Intuition Behind Gradient-Based Analysis of
Poisoning. This is a contour line visualization of the model’s
loss for different values of its parameters; each arrow cor-
responds to the step taken when computing a single model
update, and each dot is a set of parameters values obtained
after one or more steps of gradient descent from the random
initialization. This abstract representation helps understand
how poisoning impacts the loss.
comparable performance when it comes to predicting on test
data. The ML community identified that finding one of the
local minima is sufficient even if it is not the global mini-
mum [14, 20, 38]. One of these minima is the green point
obtained by gradient descent on legitimate data—the green
trajectory in Figure 9. When poison is inserted in the training
data, the adversary forces training to follow an alternative
descent that may achieve either (1) a loss indicated by the
orange dot that is similar to the green dot in the case of tar-
geted poisoning attacks, or (2) a higher loss value for the red
dot when the attack is indiscriminate. This distinction makes
it difficult to characterize poisoning solely based on the loss
achieved upon completion of training, in particular when the
attack is targeted. Instead, one should capture the trajectory
taken by gradient descent in the presence of poisoned data.
Thus, we focus on the norm and orientation of gradients.
B Differentially Private (DP) SGD
Details of DP-SGD Discussed in §5.1: To train a model
with a provable privacy guarantee, we commonly use DP-
SGD [5]—i.e., a simple modification to the popular training
mechanism, mini-batch SGD. In Algorithm 1, we highlighted
the modifications in blue. For each sample in a mini-batch,
DP-SGD first bounds the gradient computed from a sample
on the predefined value C (line 5) and adds Gaussian noise to
the gradient proportionally (line 6). DP-SGD also provides an
accounting mechanism that measures the total privacy budget
spent up to a certain iteration, which enables to estimate the
worst-case privacy leakage ε of a model. In practice, an ML
expert controls the clipping norm C and the variance σ (noise
multiplier) of the distribution where the noise is drawn to
train a model that achieves a reasonable accuracy and privacy
guarantee. The training procedure stops when the total privacy
expenditure exceeds a privacy leakage of ε. In our work, we
do not utilize DP-SGD’s privacy accounting mechanism; we
use the algorithm as a tool to realize gradient shaping.
C Neural Network Architectures
Information Relevant to §6.1: We show our two baseline
networks (an MLP and CNN) in Table 4. The description
in a parenthesis indicates the activation functions used (R:
ReLU, and ’-’: None). The output of each network is equal
to the number of classes: 10 for FashionMNIST and 100 for
CIFAR10 and Purchase-100.
D Why is the DP-Model Resilient?
Figure 10: Decision Boundaries of Vanilla and DPModels.
The boundary learned by the model trained with DP-SGD (the
right) are more complex than the vanilla model (in the middle)
and has higher confidence in decisions on the samples near it.
Discussion Related to §6.5: To understand why the DP-
model can reduce the success rate of the targeted attacks
even if the model is trained with SGD, we conduct the deci-
sion boundary analysis of two models: one trained without
DP-SGD and the one with. For this experiment, we utilize
the 2-dimensional, two-moons dataset [3] that consists of 700
training and 300 testing samples. We trained two MLP mod-
els. We set both the clipping norm and noise multiplier to 1.0;
the models achieve the accuracy of 0.98 and 0.97 respectively.
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private (DP) SGD.
Input :Dtr: training set, L : loss function, ηt : learning
rate, C: clipping norm, σ: noise multiplier
Output :θ: model parameters, ε: overall privacy cost
1 initialize θ0 randomly;
2 for t ∈ [T ] do
3 xt ← a mini-batch of random samples;
4 gt ← ∇θtL( fθ(xt),yt) ; // compute gradient
5 g¯t ← gt/max(1, ||gt (xt )||2C ) ; // clip gradient
6 g¯t ← g¯t +N (0,σ2I) ; // add noise
7 θt+1← θt −ηt g¯t ; // descent: update θ
8 end
9 return θT , ε;
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MLP CNN
Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size
FC (R) 256 Conv (R) 3x3x16
FC (-) # classes Conv (R) 3x3x32
- - MaxPool 2x2 (p: 0.5)
- - FC (R) 64
- - FC (-) # classes
Table 4: Neural Network Architectures. The architectures
of neural networks (MLP and CNN) used in our evaluation.
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Figure 11: The Accuracy of a Model over Clean and Poi-
son Samples During Training. We plot the case of the ran-
dom LF attacks in the upper figure and the SOTA attack case
in the lower plot. In both cases, we use 40% of poisons.
Figure 10 illustrates the decision boundary of the vanilla-
and DP-model. The leftmost figure shows the distribution of
the two-moons dataset with the color red and blue correspond-
ing to each class, and in the other two figures, we display
the boundary in the figure’s background. The contour colors
indicates the decision confidence: if the color is darker, the
higher the confidence is. The white area in between is where
the decision boundary lies.
Here, we found that, when a model is trained with DP-SGD
in a way that the model achieves the best possible accuracy,
the model learns complex decision boundary—i.e., it overfits
to the training data. We also observe that, in the DP-model,
the white-area where a model is uncertain about its decisions
becomes narrower. This means the overall confidence of the
E Analysis of Training-time Accuracy in the
Indiscriminate Poisoning Attacks
Discussion Related to §7.1: The training-time accuracy ob-
served during training is an indicator that shows whether the
model’s decision will increase; thus, the amount of parame-
ter updates—the sum of the gradients required for misclas-
sifications of targets—will increase. In consequence, in the
one-shot attack, the success rate of the attacker decreases and
the multi-poison attack has to use more poisons.
model learns its decision boundary based on a specific set of
samples. Hence, we monitor the accuracy of a model over the
clean data and poisons during training in the random LF and
the SOTA attacks formulated by [41]. Figure 11 illustrates the
training-time accuracy monitored in both the attacks. In the
random LF attack (upper), the accuracy of a model over clean
samples is more than 80% over 40 epochs whereas the accu-
racy over the poisons is below 30%. We can see, in this case,
the model achieves 80% accuracy—the same as the accuracy
over clean data—over the testing set. On the other hand, the
training-time accuracy of a model over the poisons formu-
lated by the SOTA attack is over 90% whereas the accuracy
over the clean samples is below 80% over 40 epochs. This
means the LR model trained in the SOTA attack formulates
the decision boundary based on the poisons and cannot be
modified easily during training. From our analysis in §7.1, we
know the poisons consist of a single image of the class coat
and two images of the class dress; thus, the model uses these
poisons as pivots for the linear decision boundary and, during
training, it is changed by the clean samples marginally.
F Trade-offs Between Model’s Utility and Pri-
vacy Leakage
Analysis of the Utility Loss When We Use DP-SGD (§6):
Here, we discuss the trade-offs between the model’s utility
and privacy leakage (ε) in Figure 12. DP-SGD/-Adam is de-
signed to control the leakage of a model by adding noise to
gradients, which inherently causes the performance degrada-
tion of a resulting model. Observe that one can minimize the
noise added to each gradient (ergo improve the utility of the
model learned) by minimizing the clipping norm. However,
setting a very small value for the clipping norm destroys im-
portant information carried in the gradients. Similarly, one
can choose to retain this information by choosing a large
value for the clipping norm. This, in turn, translates to a large
value of noise required to the gradients, degrading utility.
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Neural Network (MLP) (FashionMNIST) Neural Network (CNN) (CIFAR-10)
Figure 12: Utility of Models Trained with Different DP-SGD Parameters. We illustrate the utility of models trained with vari-
ous DP-SGD parameters. We see that the model’s utility decreases when we use a stronger privacy guarantee—a smaller clipping
norm and higher noise multiplier. We examine three models (LR, MLP, and CNN) trained on Purchases-100, FashionMNIST,
and CIFAR-10, respectively.
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